The American Enterprise Institute's Iraq Study and Our Future Policy
By Chad A. B. Wilson
Published January 8, 2007, 10:16 am in Military / Foreign policy.
The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (AEI) is a conservative think tank that serves as the unofficial policy maker of the Bush presidency. According to the AEI website, "AEI's purposes are to defend the principles and improve the institutions of American freedom and democratic capitalism--limited government, private enterprise, individual liberty and responsibility, vigilant and effective defense and foreign policies, political accountability, and open debate." Notice the keywords there: "capitalism," "limited government," "private enterprise," "individual," "defense," etc. Nearly every word from their mission statment screams traditional conservatism, George W. Bush conservatism. We need to know that from the outset. Why? Because of Bush's unveiling of a new Iraq policy this week (possibly even today, Monday, January 8).
It's no coincidence that the AEI unveiled its own Iraq study last Friday, January 5. This was done at a who's who of sorts with Senators John McCain and Joseph Lieberman as the guest speakers. It's also no coincidence that the new Democratic House was busy yakking it up about the dangers of increasing troop levels. I can't speak to the exact moments the events occured, but they happened on the same days. As Nancy Pelosi, Harry Reid, Joseph Biden, and other prominent Democrats were busy stating that increasing levels of troops was a mistake, the AEI was busy with its gala stating that an escalation was the only way to win the war. No wonder John McCain and Joseph Lieberman were there. These two Senators have been proponents of this policy shift for quite a while now. It's one place where Joseph Lieberman will follow his "independent" sway. Even though he caucuses with the Democrats, he's still an independent, and I don't expect he and Pelosi to see eye to eye on Iraq anytime soon.
Let's look at the AEI's document, entitled "Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq" (Phase I Report, or PIR). I can't help but notice the similarities and differences between this and the Iraq Study Group report: "The Way Forward--A New Approach" (ISGR). The ISGR is much more humble in its titular statement. It claims that it has "a new approach" that offers "a way forward." That's very different from the PIR, which says it offers the "plan for success." The first part of the ISGR title suggests that the report is a way to move on, while the PIR suggests that it is the only option. If what the U.S. wants is victory in Iraq, then they must choose it by following the guidelines in the AEI report. The motives may be the same: offering a new approach that will allow the U.S. to win the war in Iraq, but even the titles tell us something about these studies. The PIR is a no-compromise condemnation of every other strategy. The ISGR is one way forward, and that doesn't even mean "victory" necessarily. The ISGR even spends a lot of time stating that it isn't qualified to speak on every aspect of the war or on every alternative solution. The PIR has no such qualms. It is sure about its every claim, and many of the statements verge on attack rhetoric.
Let's look at a few of these instances.
The PIR begins by defining the challenges of Iraq and its importance in the international stage. The U.S. must choose victory. I like the way victory is seen as a choice here. It suggests that until now, the U.S. has chosen defeat, and we must simply make the tough decision and push forward and we will win. But that's beside the matter. The PIR says that "There can be no question that victory in Iraq is worth considerable American effort or that defeat would be catastrophic" (3). This report doesn't go into too many details about the cause and effect relationship between losing or winning and other events, just as the ISGR did not. They assume that it is enough to say that "failure in Iraq now will likely lead to regional war, destabilizing important states in the Middle East and creating a fertile ground for terrorism" (3). And let the matter end there. But "Success will give the United States critical leverage against Iran, which is now positioning itself to become the regional hegemon after our anticipated defeat. It will strengthen America’s position around the world, where our inability to contain conflict in Iraq is badly tarnishing our stature. And success will convert a violent, chaotic region in the heart of the Middle East and on the front line of the Sunni-Shiite divide into a secure state able to support peace within its borders and throughout the region" (3). That's enough, I guess, but I'm left wanting much more about how a secure Iraq will be able to bring peace to the region and how winning there will make Iran negotiate more with us, presumably giving up its nuclear weapons programs. I understand how the logic works, but there are some leaps there that are left unsaid, and I wish someone, whether the ISGR or the PIR would finally come out and say them.
Then the PIR says that the way to win is to secure Baghdad. They advocate a new kind of clear and hold method. In the current method, American soldiers secure a neighborhood of all combatants, and then leave the Iraqis--whether police, militia, or army--to hold the neighborhood. It doesn't work. Soon after the Americans leave, the neighborhood disintegrates into violence again. So the PIR says that we need more American troops to go in and both clear and hold these neighborhoods. No more depending on the Iraqis to do it, for they have proven themselves incapable. We need more troops to be able to control Baghdad. And where Baghdad goes, Iraq (and presumably the rest of the Middle East) goes.
I like that strategy. It makes sense to me. I don't like it that I agree with the AEI, but I like their strategy here.
And then they discuss the alternatives with quite a bit of righteous indignation. Regarding the ISGR's suggestion that the U.S. should negotiate more with Syria and Iran, the PIR says, "The problem with relying on Iraq’s neighbors to control the violence is less that they will not do so than that they cannot. This approach is a blind alley that will lead nowhere because it misrepresents the fundamental nature of the problem in Iraq" (41-42).
And then there is the withdrawal of troops from Iraq, about which the PIR says, "Many of these arguments are irrelevant or invalid" (43).
My favorite paragraph is this one: "The War Was Wrong from the Beginning. This argument for withdrawal is without any logical foundation. Whatever the wisdom or folly of the initial decision to invade Iraq in 2003, the problems the United States faces there now are real and imminent. The lives of millions of people literally hang in the balance in a country poised on the brink of fullscale civil war. The issues at stake are far too mportant to allow resentment at an earlier decision to prevent a rational assessment of the best course of action today. America has a responsibility to pursue its own interests in Iraq, and those interests require establishing security and a legitimate government. And America has an obligation to the Iraqi people that it would be immoral and reprehensible to ignore" (43).
Sure, I would never say it quite like that, but it gets the point across. Here is where I break away from the Democrats and tend to follow the McCain/Lieberman/Bush point of view. We can't just pull out. But then the ISGR never said that, either.
Basically, this report offers one thing that is new: we must secure Baghdad, and the only way to do that is to send in more troops indefinitely.
And I'm sorry to say, I think I agree with them. And I bet Bush will, too. But then he'll have to fight most of Congress to do it.
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